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DEFENDING DEFENDERS:
REMARKS ON NICHOL AND PIERCE
MARSHALL J. BREGERt
INTRODUCTION
Dean Nichol and Professor Pierce have presented two inter-
esting views of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife! Both read this
case as the first instance in which the U.S. Supreme Court has
limited the power of Congress to confer standing on individuals to
sue. Dean Nichol views this limitation as part of Justice Scalia's
"broader agenda" of reducing the role of the judiciary in govern-
ment policymaking.2 Professor Pierce views it as part of a differ-
ent project: Reducing the role of Congress in government policy-
making?
Both Nichol and Pierce, as devotees of grand theory, are
interested in analyzing Scalia's "agenda," however described. They
view Defenders as a fundamental change in the Court's standing
jurisprudence, in part because of the symbolism they and their
fellow detractors impart to the decision. In contrast, I am appar-
ently a miniaturist, at least when it comes to the possibility of
grand theories and "broader agendas." I say this because I do not
read Defenders as a major departure in the law of standing. The
case merely applied a settled principle-that the case or contro-
versy requirement in Article III of the Constitution requires a
t Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. B.A., M.A. 1967, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania; B. Phil. 1970, Oriel College, Oxford University; J.D. 1973, University
of Pennsylvania.
I want to thank Edward Sieger, Steven Mandel, and Nate Spiller of the Depart-
ment of Labor for their valuable insights and assistance in the preparation of these re-
marks presented at a symposium on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held at Duke Uni-
versity School of Law on January 21, 1993. These remarks were prepared while the au-
thor served as Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
2. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1166 (1993).
3. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993).
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plaintiff to prove a particularized injury or injury in fact-to a
situation where Congress did not define such an injury and the
plaintiff did not otherwise prove that it would suffer cognizable
injuries. Like Justice Kennedy, I do not read Justice Scalia's opin-
ion to hold that Congress cannot confer standing by defining an
injury and relating it to a class of persons entitled to sue.'
I also believe the decision correctly insisted on proof of the
required injury. The suggestion of Dean Nichol and Professor
Pierce, that Congress can eliminate the injury in fact requirement
introduces a novel and unwise departure from established princi-
ples of standing. That requirement is an important curb on judicial
power, which otherwise can serve not only to further the interests
of individuals or groups whom judges perceive as beneficiaries of
a statute, but to further the interests of entities the statute was
supposed to regulate. While at the Department of Labor, I had a
first-hand example of the dangers of such overreaching under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). In AFL-CIO v.
OSHA,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
cently overturned numerous air contaminant exposure limits on a
challenge by several industries that never claimed to be affected
by most of the limits. Relying on Defenders, the Department
sought rehearing in the Eleventh Circuit in hopes of reversing this
judicial overreaching thus enlarging OSHA's ability to protect
American workers.
I will return to the Eleventh Circuit's decision later. First, I
want to clarify what I see as the holding of Defenders. Next, I
explain why I believe the decision was correctly decided. Finally, I
explain why I do not believe the decision represents a radical
change in the law of standing.
4. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
5. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
6. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane at 4-6, AFL-CIO
v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (No. 89-7815). The petition was denied and the
Justice Department determined not to seek Supreme Court review of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruling. 54 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A7 (Mar. 23, 1993).
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I. THE HOLDING OF DEFENDERS: PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO
PROVE INJURY IN FACr AND CONGRESS DID NOT
OTHERWISE GRANT IT STANDING
As Dean Nichol and Professor Pierce have discussed, Defend-
ers arose when an environmental group challenged a regulation
interpreting the Endangered Species Act (the Act) to require each
federal agency to consult with the Secretary of Interior before
funding projects in the United States or on the high seas that
could affect an endangered species. The Court held that the plain-
tiff did not have standing to pursue the action. The Court's deci-
sion-and I leave out of this discussion that part of Justice Scalia's
opinion which dealt with redressability, as it did not command a
majority of the Court-had two lines of reasoning. First, the Court
held that the plaintiff did not prove injury in fact under the
Court's precedents. Second, the Court held that Congress did not
grant the plaintiff standing in the statute.
A. Plaintiff Failed to Prove "Imminent" and "Particularized" Inju-
ries
In holding that the plaintiff had not shown injury in fact to
any of its members, the Court applied its precedents requiring
such an injury to be "imminent" and "particularized." At the
summary judgment stage, the affidavits of two Defenders' mem-
bers showed a threatened, particularized injury but did not show
that it was imminent. These affidavits showed that ihe members
had traveled to habitats of endangered species to observe them
and intended to return but did not state when they would do so.
"Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will
be" was not enough to confer standing.7
In rejecting Defenders' novel "nexus" theories, the Court
applied its precedents requiring a particularized injury. The Court
reasoned that, because the "ecosystem nexus" theory would give
standing to any person who used any part of a "contiguous ecosys-
tem," whether or not the part they used was affected by the alleg-
edly unlawful action being challenged, it was inconsistent with
earlier precedents.8 Similarly, the Court rejected the "animal nex-
7. Defenders, 112-S. Ct. at 2138.
8. Id. at 2139 (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990);
1204 [Vol. 42:1202
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us" and "vocational nexus" theories, which sought standing for
anyone interested in studying or seeing the endangered animals
anywhere on the globe and for anyone with a "professional inter-
est in such animals," because they did not show how a person
with these interests would be harmed by the challenged action.9
In Justice Scalia's words, it was "beyond all reason" that "anyone
who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, [or] anyone
who is a keeper . . . in th[at] Zoo" can sue regarding a federally
funded project in Sri Lanka. 10 This part of the Court's decision
did not make new law. It reemphasized and applied the well-es-
tablished principle that standing requires a plaintiff to prove an
injury that is imminent and particularized. None of the dissenting
or concurring Justices disputed these requirements, though they
had differing views on what a plaintiff has to prove to meet
them."
By the way, Richard Pierce, Cass Sunstein, and others argue
that Congress could easily "fix" the standing problem by making a
legislative finding that individuals suffer harm under the three
nexus theories-"ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus," and "profes-
sional nexus."' 2 Pierce assumes that it is obvious that Congress
wants to do this. Indeed, he suggests that all Congress needs to do
is make explicit what it meant and what is already implicit in the
Act.3
I do not want to debate here whether Congress can, in fact,
provide such a standing "fix." It seems likely, however, that Con-
gress, even a Democratic Congress, will think twice before acting
in ways that formally legitimate such New Age jurisprudential
theories as "ecosystem nexus" or "animal nexus." If Congress was
not explicit on these matters, it is likely because it did not want to
be. That point should be kept in mind when someone suggests
ignoring the need for particularized injury in the face of such
"exotic" theories.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 2152-54 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2146 (Kenne-
dy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); iaL at 2147-49
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2138 n.2; id. at 2140 n.3.
12. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1181-82.
13. L at 1181.
1993] 1205
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B. Congress Did Not Create a "Procedural Right" Sufficient to
Confer Standing
To return to Defenders, the second part of the Court's deci-
sion holds that the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, which allows "any person" to sue to redress violations of
the Act, does not give standing to just "anyone" to sue for such
violations.1 4 It is not clear whether the Court construed this pro-
vision, as the court of appeals did, to confer a "procedural right"
on anyone to sue without any need to allege discrete injury-a
point I will address laterl---but the Court made it clear that Ar-
ticle III prevents Congress from doing so. 6 The Court relied on
a number of earlier cases that held that there is no Article III
case or controversy when a person alleges only a generally avail-
able grievance about government. It explained that the particular-
ized or discrete injury requirement of these cases is rooted in
separation of powers concerns, specifically, that Congress not be
able to transfer to courts the responsibility of the executive branch
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."" The Court
also recognized, however, that under its precedents, statutes may
establish categories of injury that may be alleged in support of
standing, as long as the party seeking review has suffered a con-
crete injury. Thus, an individual can enforce procedural rights
prescribed by statute, as long as "the procedures in question are
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest, that is, the
ultimate basis, of his standing." 8
II. DEFENDERS WAS CORRECT IN THESE HOLDINGS
A. The Court Properly Reaffirmed That Injury in Fact Is a Core
Element of Article II's Case or Controversy Requirement
The Court's most important holding was to reaffirm that
injury in fact is a core element of Article III's case or controversy
requirement. Probably the best way to demonstrate the Court's
correctness on this point is to examine what would happen if
Congress could eliminate the injury in fact requirement. If this
14. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-43.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
16. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143-46.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 n.8 (1992).
1206 [Vol. 42:1202
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were possible, I think the Court's fears about a transfer of execu-
tive power to the judiciary could well be realized.
For example, as I mentioned earlier in discussing the litigation
over the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) air contaminants standard, 9 courts could easily use
a citizen suit provision authorizing "any person" to sue to set
aside regulations that neither the purported beneficiaries of a
statute nor entities affected by the regulations have challenged.
Essentially, this is what the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit did. In the permissible exposure limits case, although
OSHA had promulgated 428 permissible exposure limits for chem-
icals, only twenty-three were challenged. Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit, sua sponte, vacated all 428 exposure limits.2" Keeping an
injury in fact requirement grounded in Article III will prevent
such judicial overreaching. The fact that the Department of Labor,
in seeking rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit's decision suggests
that sensible injury in fact requirements are not asserted by con-
servatives in order to promote any particular political result. Such
requirements affect regulated firms and the benefitted public
equally. Contra Pierce, I believe Defenders will cabin inappropriate
policymaking by the judiciary.
In addition, even without judicial overreaching a citizen's suit
provision which allows "any person" to sue violators and the regu-
lating agency can be disruptive of an agency's operations. Again,
this can be seen by examining what would happen if Congress
decided to include such provisions, not just in environmental stat-
utes, under which plaintiffs have brought a limited number of
suits, but in other statutes, under which we can expect more pri-
vate suits. Could Congress allow "any person" to sue for violations
of generally applicable criminal laws, for example? I suspect that
we would have not just what Justice Scalia termed the "full-time
public interest law firm, as permanently in place as the full-time
congressional lobby,"'" but also full-time advocacy groups dedi-
cated to enforcing drug forfeitures and punishing rapes and rob-
beries. At some point, such groups would challenge (or at least
seriously interfere with) the government's enforcement policies.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
20. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 987 (11th Cir. 1992).
21. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFoLK U. L. REV. 881, 893 (1983).
120719931
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Another unhealthy consequence of allowing Congress to elimi-
nate the injury in fact requirement could be disruption of the
doctrines of ripeness and mootness, which have been characterized
as "time-bound perspectives" on the injury inquiry.' If you elimi-
nate injury in fact, what basis is there for saying that a case is
either not ripe (because an injury has not yet been felt in a con-
crete way) or moot (because there is no longer an injury)? The
door is also open for courts to entertain collusive suits and issue
advisory opinions.' These possibilities would be a very real con-
cern for the Department of Labor, which often interacts informally
with members of the regulated public, for example, by issuing
opinion letters under such statutes as the Employee Retirement
Income Security Program (ERISA) and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA),z but resists attempts to litigate the views ex-
pressed in those letters in advance of an enforcement action.26
Another unwanted consequence, which the Court did not
identify in Defenders, could be an expansion of the government's
ability to exercise power over private citizens. For example, Con-
gress could decide (as it did in the statute invalidated on Article
III grounds in United States v. Evans27) to allow the government
to appeal procedural rulings after criminal acquittals to obtain
binding decisions on issues likely to arise in future cases. Another
example could occur if Congress were to enact a hypothetical
national abortion statute codifying procedural requirements involv-
ing notification and consent' and providing a right for "any per-
son" to sue. Such a statute would allow interest groups to litigate
every attempted abortion in the country, contrary to the Article
III holding in Diamond v. Charles.29 Similar statutes could over-
rule other Supreme Court decisions regarding taxpayer standing "
22. See 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531, at 350 (2d ed. 1984).
23. Cf. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL L. REV. 68, 91-92 (1984)
(recognizing that Congress cannot authorize federal courts to issue advisory opinions).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1143(c) (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 204(d) (1988).
26. See e.g., Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Counties Dist. Adult Probation Dep't v. Dole,
948 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1991).
27. 213 U.S. 297, 299-301 (1909).
28. The Court upheld state procedural notification and consent requirements in
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
29. 476 U.S. 54, 64-67 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
1208 [Vol. 42:1202
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or First Amendment challenges31 and materially change the way
that courts, litigants, and agencies do business.
Neither Dean Nichol nor Professor Pierce comes to grips with
these consequences in arguing that the Defenders Court erred in
its Article III analysis. The arguments they do make are also
unpersuasive. Dean Nichol attacks the injury in fact requirement
as a departure from the historical understanding of Article III,
noting that qui tam and informer actions were allowable in colo-
nial times and in the early period after adoption of the Constitu-
tion. 2 This argument, which other scholars have accepted,33 is
not compelling because plaintiffs in qui tam and informer actions
have an interest-money they receive if their suit is success-
ful-that may be sufficient to establish an injury in fact as the
Court understands it.' Additionally, the Court appears not to
have ruled on the constitutionality of these early actions and, as
Dean Nichol has recognized,3S has refused to decide some law-
suits that it thought raised issues not appropriate for judicial reso-
lution. Finally, the context in which the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches operate has changed significantly since the 1790s.
These changes-in particular, the growth of administrative agencies
as an arm of the executive branch and the creation by legislatures
(and some would say by courts) of numerous rights unknown at
common law-may support an understanding of Article III that
differs from common law practices.36
Dean Nichol also complains that the injury inquiry is ill-suited
to separating plaintiffs who have an injury from those who do not.
This may be so; certainly, it is not a new criticism. 7 Difficulty in
Chuch & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
32. Nichol, supra note 2, at 1150-52.
33. See, e.g., Cass IL Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Inju-
ries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 174-77 (1992).
34. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992) (distinguidhing
the asserted rights from "the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete
private interest ... by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff"); see also
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 176 (discussing monetary requirements for qui tam and in-
former suits).
35. Nichol, supra note 2, at 1156.
36. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1985) (explaining why the Fourth
Amendment may prohibit the use of deadly force to seize a felon despite a common law
practice to the contrary when the Constitution was adopted).
37. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
19931 1209
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using the established test, however, does not suggest that it should
be rejected in favor of something that would open the doors to
federal courts by discarding standing limitations. Dean Nichol has
to concede, I think, that courts need some way to dismiss suits
involving parties whose only interest is ideological combat.' The
most likely alternative would be a prudential limitation on suits.
Prudential limits would have less legitimacy because they are
judge-made and relying on them would also require a reversal of
existing law holding that Congress may eliminate prudential limita-
tions through legislation.39
Dean Nichol also misreads Defenders as broadly holding that
"even though a federal statute sought to bestow standing upon a
potential plaintiff, such a grant of jurisdiction [would] violate[] the
strictures of the case or controversy requirement."4 In fact, as I
discussed earlier, the Court recognized that statutes may create
legal rights, the invasion of which confers standing; it simply ob-
jected to Congress abandoning the concrete injury requirement
altogether.41 It is also not at all clear that the Endangered Spe-
cies Act bestows standing on "any person" to sue, regardless of
whether that person meets the constitutional requirements for
standing. In my view, a literal reading of "any person" in the
Endangered Species Act could lead to results that Congress proba-
bly did not intend. For example, because the Act defines "person"
to include, among other things, employees or agents of foreign
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531,
at 347-50.
38. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Defenders identifies important, traditional,
structural reasons why courts are not suited to resolve issues in the abstract. Defenders,
112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (observing that since
judicial power can so profoundly affect individuals' lives, liberty, and property, a decision
to seek judicial review must be placed in the hands of those who have a direct stake in
the outcome and not in the hands of concerned bystanders who will use it to vindicate
their value interests).
39. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Center for Auto Safety v. Nation-
al Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
40. Nichol, supra note 2, at 1146-47.
41. See supra Part I(A); see also Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy and
Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that "Congress
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to
suggest a contrary view").
1210 [Vol. 42:1202
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governments,42 it is possible that not only could a visitor to the
Bronx Zoo sue the Agency for International Development for
failure to consult on a Sri Lanka project, as Justice Scalia hypoth-
esized, but a clerical worker for a Luxembourg ministry of educa-
tion could do so as well. Like the dissenting court of appeals
judge, I do not believe that Congress intended "this provision to
be read in a vacuum, without regard to constitutional limita-
tions."4
I do agree with Dean Nichol, however, that Defenders may be
viewed as part of an "agenda" of reducing judicial control over
agencies.' I also agree with Professor Pierce that such an
"agenda" is not unique to Justice Scalia and not necessarily im-
proper. As Pierce discusses, there are many examples of courts
improperly second-guessing agency decisionmaking.45 Again, I
would add the Eleventh Circuit's air contaminants decision as an
example!6
I disagree, however, with Professor Pierce's further conclusion
that Defenders is part of an "agenda" to reduce the role of Con-
gress in governmental decisionmaking.47 This conclusion is based
on two questionable premises: First, that Congress, by providing a
right for "any person" to sue to enforce any requirement of the
Endangered Species Act, intended to eliminate any need to prove
particularized injury; and second, that the Supreme Court. "held"
that provision unconstitutional.'
As I discussed above, I doubt that Congress intended the
Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision to eliminate the
particularized injury requirement.49 The Court also did not say
that the statute was unconstitutional. The general rule is that a
court will construe a statute (if it is possible) to avoid doubts as
to its constitutionality and will look beyond the literal language of
a statute when such language leads to an odd result.50 One may
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988).
43. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (Bowman, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 1230 (1992).
44. Nichol, supra note 2, at 1166-67.
45. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1197.
46. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
47. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1199.
48. See id. at 1177.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
50. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454, 465-66
12111993]
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read the Court's decision, therefore, as implicitly construing the
phrase "any person" who may seek judicial review under the Act
to mean "any aggrieved person." The Court's discussion of Article
III's requirements may have been directed less at Congress and
more at the court of appeals, which had stepped out of line in its
construction. In this regard, I note that the plaintiff in Defenders
did not defend the "procedural rights" part of the court of
appeals' decision.51 I also do not believe that other courts of ap-
peals have construed citizen suit provisions to eliminate the Article
III injury requirement,52 as Professor Pierce appears to argue. 3
In other wdrds, the Court probably viewed the citizen suit provi-
sion of the Act as expressing Congress's intent to provide a pri-
vate cause of action, but not to abrogate settled rules of standing.
If the Court did hold the statute unconstitutional, however, it
may be somewhat misleading to say, as Professor Pierce does, that
this is the first time the Court has done so with a statute "that
authorized judicial review of an agency action at the behest of
members of a statutorily specified class."'  More than eighty
years ago, in United States v. Evans,55 the Court invalidated a
statute on Article III grounds allowing the government to seek
review after a criminal acquittal, 6 and in Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associ-
ates,57 the Court considered (but did not decide) whether the
Director's statutory authority to seek review of administrative
decisions under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
(1989).
51. See Brief for Respondents, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)
(No. 90-1424).
52. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912
F.2d 478, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that persons suing to enforce National
Environmental Policy Act requirements must show a sufficient geographical nexus to the
site of a challenged project so that they may be expected to suffer potential environmen-
tal consequences); Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 932 (9th
Cir. 1988) (same); City of Evanston v. Regional Transp. Auth., 825 F.2d 1121, 1126 (7th
Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988). The cases Professor Pierce cites,
Pierce, supra note 3, at 1179 n.51, are not ones in which standing appears to have been
at issue; in any event, they predate the Supreme Court's standing decisions from 1976 to
present.
53. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1179
54. IdL at 1178.
55. 213 U.S. 297 (1909).
56. Id. at 300-01.
-57. 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
1 1212 [Vol. 42:1202
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tion Act"8 was insufficient to guarantee Article III standing.59
Indeed, one would have thought it well settled that Congress can
limit, but cannot expand, constitutional standing.'
Thus, the idea that Congress cannot abandon the concrete
injury requirement is not a novelty created by Justice Scalia; the
principle is well-established. Even judges who may not agree with
the result in Defenders do not dispute that principle.6'
B. The Court's Holding That "Some Day" Intentions and Nexus
Theories Are Insufficient to Show Imminent and Particularized
Injury to Defenders' Members Was Correct
The least important of the Court's holdings was that
Defenders failed to show an imminent and particularized injury to
one of its members. As I discussed earlier,62 because Defenders
was seeking to prevent harm that had not yet occurred, it had to
show that this expected harm was imminent.63 It did not do so
because the alleged harms-the inability of two members to ob-
serve or study endangered species in foreign countries-was de-
pendent on those members going to those countries; the members
never showed that such visits were "imminent." The Court's opin-
ion explains why the members' evidence was insufficient at the
summary judgment stage.' Professor Pierce's suggestion that no
evidence should be required is highly impractical;61 it would ex-
empt standing disputes from normal summary judgment rules and
require courts to accept as fact whatever a plaintiff puts in a
pleading. The Supreme Court has already rejected such an idea.66
58. 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1988).
59. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. at 304.
60. See Nichol, supra note 2, at 1146 n.44 (recognizing dismissal of suit in Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) and the Court's holdings that Article III limits con-
gressional power to create standing, at least in theory).
61. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2148 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 2160 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting); see also Center for
Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Edwards, J.).
62. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
63. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138 n.2.
64. Id.
65. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1175-76.
66. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 65-66
(1987) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)) (finding that a defen-
dant may successfully move for summary judgment on the standing issue if he can dem-
1993] 1213
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Similarly, the Court was correct in rejecting the plaintiff's
nexus theories because, as I discussed above, these theories would
have allowed plaintiffs to sue without any proof of injury. Wheth-
er or not Congress could create standing by implementing these
nexus theories in a statute, as Professor Pierce argues,67 it did
not do so in the Endangered Species Act. That statute protects
plants and animals, not scholars, zoo keepers, or visitors to the
Bronx Zoo. Indeed, let us press this point further with the follow-
ing thought experiment. Imagine that Congress reauthorized the
text of the Endangered Species Act but with two changes. First
the title-let us imagine that Congress entitled it the Full Employ-
ment Act for Scholars. Second, the purpose clause is amended so
that the goal of the Act is to keep scholars employed. In those
circumstances, I suspect that our tenured student of the Sri Lanka
leopard, fearful that his job is vanishing right along with the en-
dangered leopard, would have standing to sue.
III. DEFENDERS DOES NOT REPRESENT A RADICAL CHANGE
IN THE LAW OF STANDING
A. The Court's Application of the Imminent and Particularized
Injury Requirements is Not That Extreme
In my view, the Court's rejection of the plaintiff's affidavits as
insufficient to show imminent injury will largely require only that
plaintiffs give greater care to their summary judgment papers. Pro-
fessor Pierce sees this part of the Court's opinion as "trivial" and
"hard to take seriously,"' and the dissent saw it as doing "little
to weed out those who are genuinely harmed from those who are
not" and more likely "resurrect[ing] a code-pleading formalism in
federal court summary judgment practice.' 69
I recently read in the Washington Post that Defenders of
Wildlife was challenging the funding of another overseas project
that could affect an endangered species; presumably the organiza-
tion has identified members who can meet the Supreme Court's
onstrate that plaintiff's allegations of standing were a "sham and raised no genuine issue
of fact").
67. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1182.
68. Id. at 1177.
69. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2153 (1992) (Blackmun and
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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standing test.7 ° Requiring such putative plaintiffs (and their law-
yers) to do their "homework" and particularize alleged injuries is
not a trivial exercise. It assists the civil justice system to work
effectively. What must be remembered is that the Defenders Court
never challenged accepted principles of standing under which orga-
nizations can represent members who in turn had a legally pro-
tected interest in their "desire to use or observe an animal species,
even for purely aesthetic purposes." The Court's recent decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' also shows that the
"particularized pleading" requirement of Defenders does not apply
when standing is challenged at the pleading, rather than at the
summary judgment, stage. a Thus the fear that Defenders will
keep all manner of worthy plaintiffs from their day in court may
prove to be misplaced.
One area where Defenders may have an impact is in tighten-
ing the Court's current view of mootness and ripeness which, as I
discussed above, may be viewed as time-based perspectives on the
injury in fact requirement. At least one court has characterized the
imminent harm requirement as "out of kilter" with Supreme Court
decisions deeming the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception to mootness to be satisfied if the repetition is likely "at
any time."'74 It is also conceivable that Defenders could lead the
Court to rethink the ripeness doctrine--originating in Abbott Lab-
oratories v. Gardner75 -which looks to "the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration" in approving pre-enforcement review of agen-
cy rulemaking.7 6 From the perspective of an agency enforcer, this
can only be beneficial. At this point, however, it is speculative to
think that Defenders will have such effects.
Similarly, the Court's decision should not foreclose future
plaintiffs from showing a particularized injury based on some
70. Groups to Sue Interior Over Dam in China, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1993, at A12.
71. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
72. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
73. Id. at 2892 n.3 (noting that the challenge to standing in Defenders would have
been unsuccessful if, as in Lucas, it had been made at the pleading stage). But see id. at
2907 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365,
371 (D.C Cir. 1992).
75. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
76. Id. at 149.
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nexus theory. They just need a statute that explicitly creates such
a nexus within the limitations of Article III's injury in fact
requirement.
B. The Court's Article III Injury in Fact Requirement Should Not
Limit Congress's Power to Create Legal Rights by Statute
Given the apparent ability of environmental groups to meet
Defenders' factual requirements, it is difficult to see how Defenders
will have a significant impact on environmental litigation. All it
might mean is that groups challenging actions that threaten some
damage to the environment must prove that one of their members
has sufficient nexus to the geographical area where damage is
threatened. As I discussed earlier, this was generally the law be-
fore Defenders, and Defenders did not change it.' Professor
Pierce's contrary view is premised on the questionable assumption
that the Court found the citizen suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act unconstitutional, from which he concludes that this
ruling will apply to other environmental statutes (some of which
require that the plaintiff be aggrieved or have an interest affect-
ed),78 with the result that only regulated firms could prove a con-
crete and particularized injury.
I think it even less likely that the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) could be affected.79 That statute is an example of
Congress creating a right for a class of persons' and providing a
means of enforcement for any person "adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action."'" Justice Scalia has long recognized
that the right to judicial review is clear where a statute "requires
an agent of the executive to provide a particular benefit directly
77. Compare Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (before Defend-
ers, plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of land in the vicinity of land covered by agency ac-
tions was insufficient to create standing) with Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage
Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1322 (7th Cir. 1992) (after Defenders, group representing persons
living close to landfill has standing).
78. Pierce, supra note 3, at 1188-89; see, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1988) (Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (1988) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).
79. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 1189-90.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) (designating that upon proper request, agencies "shall
make [certainI records promptly available to any person").
81. Id. § 702.
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to a particular individual."'  The defect in the Endangered Spe-
cies Act was that Congress had not created a comparable right.
Instead, it placed on agencies a duty to consult before funding
projects that could affect plants and animals; it did not specify
how this duty created or affected any rights in a human plain-
tiff.83
Finally, I think unfounded Dean Nichol's and Professor
Pierce's fears that Defenders will have major effects beyond envi-
ronmental law and FOIA, in particular their argument that only
regulated firms will have standing to challenge agency action and
that, therefore, agencies will be captured by regulated interests.' 4
The premise for their argument appears to be that Defenders
changed the law on Article III standing to create an injury re-
quirement that will be impossible to meet in most cases.85 As I
have shown, Defenders did not change the law; moreover, its test
is not difficult to satisfy. In fact, as the Court has recognized, it is
consistent with the test normally applied for individuals seeking
review of final agency action, which requires that they be adverse-
ly affected or aggrieved by it."
I have argued for a modest interpretation of Defenders-that
Congress when it passed the Endangered Species Act was not
specific as to what the injury was, and that Congress cannot just
authorize citizen suits, it must specify who has an injury. In this
regard, I do not read Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders as stat-
ing that the Court can veto Congress if Congress goes "too far" in
extending standing. Although that may be the learning of Justice
Scalia's 1983 article,' it is not the necessary, or even preferred,
ratiocination of the Defenders opinion.
But let us take the "robust" reading of Defenders put forth
straw-man style by Dean Nichol and Professor Pierce. Is it, as a
cautionary set of limits, so obviously off-course? I think not. My
82. Scalia, supra note 21, at 885-86.
83. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992) (characterizing
right to sue as "abstract, self-contained, non-instrumental"); id. at 2147 (Kennedy and
Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that Congress at
least has to identify the injury and relate it to a class of persons entitled to sue).
84. See Nichol, supra note 2, at 1168; Pierce, supra note 3, at 1194-95.
85. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 1192.
86. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1981).
87. Scalia, supra note 21.
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main point is a simple one, but I am a bit skittish of saying
it-you cannot deconstruct the Constitution. Even Congress cannot
do so. It is interesting that Professor Sunstein himself recognizes
this. He affirms that there are "limits to Congress' power to de-
cide what is a 'case' or 'controversy.' "" Thus he admits:
In all likelihood, for example, Congress is barred from overcom-
ing the ban on advisory opinions. This ban is a plausible infer-
ence from the "Opinions in Writing" Clause, which allows the
President to require opinions from heads of departments, but not
from judges. Moreover, the notion of a "case," as historically un-
derstood, excludes the judicial provision of advice at the behest
of public officials.'
This, then, is the whole ball game. Congress cannot redefine
at will the "core" meaning of terms such as "advisory opinions" or
"cases and contoversies." The judiciary's assigned constitutional
role is to adjudicate "cases and controversies"-a term which,
although 'amenable to a variety of meaning, is not open-textured.
This admittedly structural perspective is but one modality of con-
stitutional argument. Nonetheless, whereas the outer limits set by
Defenders will not, in practice, affect most lawsuits, it offers an
important, heuristic, constitutional truth 0
88. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 179 n.79.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. See generally PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP
BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
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